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Abstract 
 
The scope of the supplementary pension funds is to provide workers with a 
satisfactory standard of living at retirement. An efficient and affordable system of 
pension funds is therefore an important factor to realize the   workers’   aims   of  
maximizing the value of their pension wealth. A rationalization of the industry 
structure, leading to the creation of bigger pension funds, that should be better able to 
take advantage of economies of scale, might contain the costs sustained by 
participants. 
In this paper, and for the first time (to the best of our knowledge), we attempt to 
carry out an econometric study of the principal factors which determine the costs 
level and the efficiency of Italian pension funds.  
Based on an original dataset of Italian closed pension funds in the 2007-2013 period, 
this work runs a panel estimate of the impact of dimension (the number of 
participants) on administrative costs. Our results highlight the existence of important 
overall economies of scale and that in those funds characterized by the outsourcing 
of some activities, the administrative costs result smaller.  
We adopt the same dataset also for the open pension funds, in order to evaluate the 
link between financial costs and the sum of resources under management. The 
estimates do not confirm the existence of particular economies of scale, probably due 
to the distinctive traits of the complementary pension funds industry in Italy. The 
commission fees of the financial management of pension funds, in particular of 
closed type, are much lower than those relative to other financial services and also to 
other types of foreign pension funds. This situation, fuelled by competition among 
financial managers, has gone on for some time, thus further limiting the ways in 
which savings can be made through an increase in the volume of the assets managed. 
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1. Introduction 
In most developed countries, social security saving is an important source of funds for 
the financial market. An efficient and affordable system of pension funds is therefore 
crucial to achieve a satisfactory workers’  rate  of  substitution. Covip, the Italian pension 
funds’ supervisory authority, has introduced, in the last years, several measures leading 
pension funds to invest more in their internal structures and in other monitoring 
mechanisms and has repeatedly stressed the necessity   of   containing   pension   funds’  
costs1. The usual argument is that a process of merger and supply rationalization would 
result in an increase of the average size of pension funds, therefore making possible to 
better exploit economies of scale and significantly contribute to costs reduction.  
In section 2, we briefly provide a review of the literature on pension funds’ efficiency. 
In section 3, we supply some general data regarding the costs of Italian pension funds 
and we explain the reasons of this study. 
In section 4, we illustrate the methodology adopted in the construction of our dataset.  
In section 5, we investigate the administrative costs. After an initial descriptive analysis 
of their dimension for the different types of pension funds, with an econometric analysis 
we evaluate the variables with the strongest impact on the costs level, in order to verify 
the presence of the economies of scale and whether there is a threshold effect in the 
level of membership.  
In section 6, we analyze the financial costs of the different lines of investment of 
pension funds. Also in this case, we verify the possible presence of economies of scale 
with an econometric analysis.  
2. The  literature  on  pension  funds  efficiency 
In the international context, the literature on the efficiency of pension funds and the 
impact of costs on pension performance is rather scant. The development of this line of 
research is limited by the scarce availability of data and the difficulty in modeling a 
                                                 
1  See, for example, the 2010 Report – President’s   Considerations – Covip (2011): “To sustain the 
profitability of the complementary pension, it is absolutely necessary to further reduce costs, in 
particular those of PIPs, and to conduct direct analyses in greater depth in order to pinpoint the best 
risk/return combinations. For negotiated funds, the renewal of the management mandate represents a 
good opportunity for examining the results obtained and evaluating the investment policies of the 
Board  of  Directors  in  greater  depth.”  
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production function, which adequately may represent the pension funds operating 
principles.  
Bateman and Mitchell (2004) estimated that the growth of one percentage point in the 
annual management commission fees implies, after forty years of contribution, a 27% 
reduction in the final value of pension wealth.  
Some authors have focused on the effect that pension funds characteristics have on 
administrative costs, both in defined benefit and defined contribution plans, with 
reference in particular to two countries, the US (Caswell, 1976, Mitchell and Andrews, 
1981) and Australia (Bateman and Mitchell, 2004). Other works have examined for 
various countries the costs and commissions of defined contribution funds (see 
Whitehouse, 2000, Dobronogov and Murthi, 2005, James et al., 2005). 
On the whole, the literature has demonstrated the existence of significant economies of 
scale in the administrative costs of pension funds. At the same time, cross-country 
studies have highlighted important differences at the national level with respect to size 
and fees of the different pension funds (see, among others, Mitchell, 1998).  
Empirical studies on the economies of scale of pension funds have up to now failed to 
confirm the impact of costs reduction on the quality of service. In a study of the Dutch 
market, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2007) reports a more personalized service in smaller 
pension funds, even if this implies higher costs. The differences with regard to 
administrative costs therefore appears to be due not only to economies of scale, but also 
to the quality of service and the complex business model on which the smaller funds are 
based.  
A recent study by Bikker and de Drew (2009) focused on the Dutch market, shows the 
existence of strong economies of scale, both in administrative and financial costs. 
Greater efficiency is found in pension funds which gather the population of an entire 
industrial sector, rather than in those at the company level. Furthermore, the operating 
costs of defined contribution funds appear inferior to those of defined benefit schemes. 
Similarly, funds with a greater percentage of pensioners show higher costs. To our 
knowledge, there are no attempts to estimate the role of economies of scale in Italian 
pension funds industry.  
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3.   The  reasons  of  the  study 
Figure 1 shows the reduction in the final value of total assets of a generic pension fund 
in the presence of a 1, 2 or 3% cost level, expressed in terms of a synthetic cost 
indicator (SCI)2. After 40 years of contributions, even a higher cost of only 1%, might 
imply a considerably significant reduction in the final performance and the accumulated 
stock value.  
Figure 2, on the other hand, shows that, in the Italian pension funds market, the declared 
SCI of various pension funds varies from the 0.2% of closed pension funds to the 1.6% 
of PIPs (individual plans) after a thirty-five year period.  
The aim of our study is to verify the factors which have the greatest impact on the total 
administrative costs and financial management expenses of Italian pension funds and, 
on the basis of current market structure, to provide an estimate of the optimal dimension 
of pension funds, a dimension beyond which the growth in terms of participants or 
assets no longer generates an improvement in unit cost.  
                                                 
2  The SCI is calculated in the same way for all forms of supplementary pension industry and is the result 
of the difference between the internal rate of return of a funded scheme without costs and one in which 
costs are included. Current laws require pension funds to declare in a specific document (Nota 
informativa) the index calculated for four different periods of contribution to the pension scheme (2, 5, 
10 and 35 years), given a hypothetical regular payment of €  2,500 per annum and a nominal 4% gross 
interest rate. In calculating the SCI, taxes on annual yields, adhesion costs such as enrollment fees, 
annual and transfer costs (fixed or as a percentage of the contribution) and fees as a percentage of assets 
are taken into consideration. Over performance fees are not included in this index. 
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Figure 1. Reduction in the final total assets given a different costs level  
 
Source: Mefop  
Note: hypothetical  regular  payment  of  € 2,500 per annum at a nominal 4% gross interest rate. 
 
Figure 2. SCI average for Italian pension funds (December 2012). 
 
Source: Previ|DATA (Mefop database) 
We use a dataset of closed pension funds, with annual data for the 2007-2013 seven-
year period. The breakdown of total costs was taken from the Total Expenses Ratio 
(TER), which expresses the annual administrative and financial costs actually incurred 
as a percentage of the average asset of pension funds at the end of the year. 
In this study both administrative and investment costs are considered. These are 
categories of costs which are influenced by diverse factors: administrative costs are in 
general paid off by the fund itself, while financial costs vary on the basis of the single 
investment lines and of financial managers ability and management complexity. 
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Administrative costs are normally linked to the total number of fund participants, while 
financial costs are influenced by the volume of managed assets.  
 
4. The  costs  dataset 
 
Our costs database was elaborated by using a breakdown of the TER for closed pension 
funds relative to the 2007-2013 period. The TER is an indicator which expresses annual 
costs as a percentage of total assets at the end-of-year. When calculating the TER, all 
the costs actually sustained for both financial and administrative management, with the 
exception of tax obligations3, are taken into account. 
For closed pension funds, the TER may be broke down into the following items: 
1) investment costs:  
a) management commissions; 
b) guarantee commissions; 
c) over performance commissions; 
d) bank deposit payments;  
2) administrative costs:  
a) general administrative expenses;  
b) costs for administrative services purchased from third parties;  
c) other administrative costs. 
 
We calculated the absolute values of costs by multiplying the previous values by the 
total assets of each investment line at the end of the year. 
 For administrative costs we choose to focus only on closed pension funds since 
the open funds usually do not explicitly report administrative expenses, given that they 
are accounted in the balance sheet of the sponsoring organization (banks or insurance 
companies). 
                                                 
3  See the framework for the document Nota informativa to the regulation set by Covip on 31 October, 
2006. 
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5. Administrative  costs,  dimension  and  outsourcing 
We start by investigating the dynamic of administrative costs. The variable that most 
successfully can be associated to administrative costs of pension funds is the number of 
participants: an increase in the fund dimension produces efficiency gains if the level of 
administrative costs increases less than proportionately to the number of participants.  
Administrative costs include those relative to the staff, administrative services (all 
closed pension funds rely on an external organization which provide the management of 
administrative activities) and a range of expenses   relative   to   the   fund’s   operation,  
among which there are promotion costs and those linked to business premises, 
consultants, auditors and other suppliers. Usually they do not include costs sustained by 
the financial manager and bank deposit fees, which are included in the financial costs. 
A strong correlation between unit costs and fund size appears evident in an analysis of 
pension fund data. Table 1 shows the average administrative costs per participant in 
2013, or expressed as a percentage of assets according to the size of the fund, both in 
terms of number of participants and of managed asset. In general, there is a significant 
decreasing level of unit costs.  
A participant of a small fund sustained administrative costs for a total of approximately 
€ 34 in 2013, more than those sustained by a participant of a larger fund (€ 19.63)4. 
Also the level of costs on total assets (0.34%) is the double in smaller funds than that of 
larger ones (0.14%). 
                                                 
4  Generally a closed pension fund covers administrative costs by sums directly paid participants 
(enrollment fee, annual fees, expenses for individual prerogatives such as prepayment or redemption of 
benefits). However, such costs are partially borne by the employer.  
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Table 1. Administrative costs based on size (2013) 
Size classes 
based on 
 Average values 
Number of 
funds 
Administrati
ve costs per 
participant 
(€) 
Administra-
tive costs / 
assets (%) 
Assets per 
member (€) 
Total assets 
(€m) Participants 
number of participants (thousand) 
 0-10  9 34.12 0.30 16,608 119.49 7,108 
10-50  15 31.43 0.16 21,191 685.76 34,206 
over 50  11 19.63 0.14 15,947 2,095.12 124,051 
Total assets (million) 
0-150  7 29.10 0.33 13,063 88.78 6,866 
150-450  6 40.11 0.17 25,486 320.96 15,887 
over 450  22 25.00 0.15 18,109 1,448.23 81,738 
Total 35 28.41 0.19 18,365 983.09 55,475 
Source: Mefop, Previ|DATA 
5.1. Definition of the econometric model 
The initial descriptive analysis confirms the existence of economies of scale in 
pension funds industry. An increase of the participants’ number gives to the fund a 
greater negotiating strength when dealing with suppliers, and at the same time allows 
the fund to allocate the amount of fixed costs over a larger number of members. It is 
therefore useful to investigate the existence of economies of scale in relation to 
administrative costs. 
In order to decide what structural variables has to be included in the estimation model, 
we break down the administrative costs into diverse components: 
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝐴𝑆𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶 + 𝑂𝐴𝐶 
where 
x ASC = administrative service costs; 
x SC = staff costs; 
x PC = promotion costs; 
x OAC = other administrative costs. 
 
Administrative service costs derive mainly from the cost of the service as the funds 
outsource most of the administrative activities. Such costs are in general expressed in 
terms of each administrated participant, plus other expenses linked to specific single 
activities (request of benefit or transfers). Part of the cost of administrative services is 
linked to the way in which participants interact with the fund. For example, members 
who have been in the fund for longer than eight years are more likely to request an 
9 
 
advance payment5, with some additional costs for managing the procedure. A proxy of 
the number of years spent in a pension funds is given by the total assets per participant 
(it is in general higher for workers who have a long profile of membership). In addition, 
members with a high level of resources tend more likely to change profile of investment 
or take advantage of the possibility of spreading his/her holdings over more than one 
line of investment. This possibility, which is not allowed by all pension funds, might 
increase   the   individual  member’s  management   costs. At the same time, the more the 
investment lines supplied, the more the complexity of administrative management.  
We can therefore suggest the following form for the administrative service costs: 
𝐴𝑆𝐶 = 𝑓 ൭𝐴𝑃𝑃ถ
(ା)
, 𝑃𝑆𝐻ถ
(ା)
, #𝐿ด
(ା)
൱ 
where 
x APP = assets per participant; 
x PSH = possibility of spreading the holdings on more than one line; 
x #L = number of available lines. 
 
Staff costs tend to be fixed in relation to the number of participants and to increase only 
when membership exceeds certain levels that might require the hiring of new 
employees. The   fund’s   outsourcing   choices   have an impact on staff costs. Some 
administrative activities may in fact be carried out by internal staff and not delegated to 
external services. In the start-up years, pension funds tended to outsource most of 
administrative activities. As the market and participants’ number have grown, many 
funds have begun to reallocate some administrative activities to the internal structure, 
but in smaller funds the common practice is still the outsourcing. For this reason, we 
can expect to find lower staff costs in pension funds which outsource most of their 
administrative activities.  
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑓 ൭%𝑂ต
(ି)
൱ 
where %O = weight of outsourcing: administrative service costs over total 
administrative costs. 
                                                 
5 In Italy participants may ask for an advance payment only after eight years of membership, except when 
they have to face medical expenses. 
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Promotion costs tend not to vary according to the number of participants, while they 
might be influenced by the structure of their target group: the greater the number of 
potential members, the higher the difficulties in reaching them through a promotion 
campaign. In the same way, a fund aimed at a specific company (or group) or territory 
(e.g., a region), would pay less communication expenses than those targeted at a wider 
number of companies.  
𝑃𝐶 = 𝑓 ൭𝑃𝑀ต
(ା)
, 𝐶𝑅𝐹ถ
(ି)
, #𝐶ด
(ା)
൱ 
where: 
x PM = number of potential members; 
x CRF = company or regional fund; 
x #C = number of member companies. 
 
As far as other administrative obligations are concerned, in general these costs will be 
fixed or semi-fixed according to the number of members (e.g.  expenses  for   the  fund’s  
headquarters), while others will be linked to the number of participants (e.g. mailing 
expenses for periodical communication).  
 
Summing up, these are the structural variables that can influence the administrative 
costs of pension funds. 
 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑓 ൭%𝑂ต
(ି)
, 𝑃𝑀ต
(ା)
, 𝐶𝑅𝐹ถ
(ି)
, #𝐶ด
(ା)
, 𝐴𝑃𝑃  ถ
(ା)
, 𝑃𝑆𝐻ถ
(ା)
, #𝐿ด
(ା)
൱ 
We therefore decide to estimate the following regression model: 
𝐴𝐶௜௧ = 𝜃 +   ෍ 𝛼௝𝑃௜௧
௝
௝ୀଵ,ଶ
+ 𝛽  𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀௜௧ 
where: 
𝐴𝐶௜௧ = logarithm of administrative costs of pension fund i at time t;  
𝑃௜௧ = logarithm of the number of participants in pension fund i at time t; 
𝑾𝒊𝒕 = matrix of the structural variables 
 (values in logarithms) 
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a) impact of costs for outsourced services over total administrative 
costs  
b) base of potential participants 
c) average  assets  per  member  (in  €k) 
 (absolute values) 
d) number of lines 
e) dummy for type of pension fund (company, regional) 
f) dummy for possibility of spreading the holdings on more than one 
line 
𝜀௜௧= error term, i.i.d. 
 
The number of participants, expressed in logarithm form, represents the dimensional 
variable. The model is first estimated with a linear model by considering only 𝑗 = 1. 
Given that, as we have already seen, some cost items might decrease with an increase in 
the number of members (due, for example, to the fund bargaining power with reference 
to administrative service operators), while others should remain constant, we expect a 
value of 𝛼ଵ < 1. This value would indicate the presence of economies of scale, since an 
increase in the number of participants leads to a less than proportional increase in 
administrative costs, while 𝛼ଵ > 1 values would indicate the presence of diseconomies 
of scale. 
If 1 is equivalent to the threshold of constant economies of scale, the total of 
unexploited, and therefore potentially achievable, economies of scale can be expressed 
as 1 − 𝛼ଵ. 
A second model is estimated by adding the quadratic term 𝑃௜௧ଶ , in order to test the 
presence of non-linear functional form. Also in the presence of 𝛼ଵ < 1, a value of the 
coefficient 𝛼ଶ > 0 indicates that economies of scale are not constant, but tend to lose 
strength with an increase of the number of participants.  
The cost burden of outsourced services represents an indicator of the level of 
outsourcing chosen by the fund (it measures how much of the total administrative costs 
can be attributed to the outsourcer). A negative coefficient indicates that the outsourcing 
has produced an efficiency increase. As stated before, the outsourcing of administrative 
activities is very common among the Italian closed pension funds. 
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The dummy variables on the type of pension fund (company, regional) aim at verifying 
whether a company pension fund have lower promotion costs with respect to industrial 
pensions fund, which would have to contact a larger number of administrative people. 
Furthermore, a company fund should in general face less difficulty in collecting pension 
contributions. 
We can also expect higher promotion costs for those pension funds which have a highly 
elevated number of potential members, due to the difficulty of reaching all of them. 
Similarly, the larger the number of investment lines, the higher the level of 
administrative costs. This difficulty should be greater in those funds which allow 
members to spread their holdings over several lines. Another control variable is given 
by the average level of assets per participant.  
5.2. Empirical results relative to administrative costs 
Table 2 reports the results of the estimates of the model illustrated above6. In the 
analysis of the linear model (estimates 1, 3 and 6), we find a coefficient inferior to 1 for 
the logarithm of the number of participants. Such a value confirms the existence of 
economies of scale in closed pension funds. Of all the other variables, only the impact 
of outsourcing and assets per participants appears significant in all the estimates with 
the expected sign. 
Moving on to the quadratic model, the coefficients for the participants, taken 
individually, do not appear to be significant, although their joint significance is 
elevated. The coefficient 𝛼ଵ remains inferior to 1, highlighting the existence of 
economies of scale, while a positive 𝛼ଶ indicated that economies of scale decrease with 
the increase in the participants’  number. 
Also in the quadratic model, the sign and the significance of other variables  are 
confirmed. 
                                                 
6  We carried out pooled OLS and panel, random and fixed effect. The random effect estimates were run 
according to the model proposed by Mundlak (1979), adding, as variables, average values at fund level 
of the time variant variables.  
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Table 2. Estimate of administrative costs (2007-2011)  
Dependent variable: 
Administrative costs 
(logarithm) 
Pooled OLS Panel RE (Mundlak, 1979) Panel FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Participants (ln) 0.692*** -0.085 0.692*** -0.078 0.130 0.688*** -0.079 -0.052 
(0.144) (1.022) (0.204) (0.930) (1.164) (0.200) (0.919) (0.917) 
Participants (ln) squared  0.041  0.041 0.038  0.041 0.040 
 (0.054)  (0.046) (0.064)  (0.045) (0.045) 
Impact of services purchased 
from third parties on 
administrative costs (ln) 
-0.652*** -0.650*** -0.653*** -0.652*** -0.530*** -0.646*** -0.644*** -0.647*** 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.120) (0.119) (0.150) (0.118) (0.117) (0.114) 
Average assets per 
participant in k (ln) 
0.537*** 0.537*** 0.538*** 0.538***  0.536*** 0.536*** 0.543*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.169) (0.170)  (0.167) (0.168) (0.173) 
Number of potential 
members (ln) 
0.963 0.539 0.061 0.061     
(0.658) (0.858) (0.044) (0.044)     
Number of lines 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021  0.025 0.026  
(0.032) (0.032) (0.059) (0.059)  (0.056) (0.056)  
Possibility of spreading the 
holdings (dummy) 
-0.327 0.089 0.081 0.081     
(1.345) (1.451) (0.090) (0.091)     
Company fund (dummy) 0.711 0.297 -0.117 -0.117     
(1.416) (1.516) (0.123) (0.123)     
Regional fund (dummy) 1.357* 0.805 -0.263 -0.263     
(0.802) (1.077) (0.206) (0.206)     
Constant -7.266 1.241 8.142*** 8.153*** 10.828*** 4.616** 8.119 7.981 
(6.317) (12.755) (1.707) (1.708) (2.261) (2.052) (4.840) (4.882) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund dummy Yes Yes       
Observations 245 245 245 245 247 247 247 247 
Number of funds   38 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.98 0.98    0.64 0.64 0.64 
Test 𝛼ଵ = 1 0.034 0.290 0.131 0.246 0.455 0.127 0.247 0.259 
Test 𝛼ଵ, 𝛼ଶ = 0  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 
Hausman test (prob.)    0.894 0.797    
clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5.3. Efficient dimension for administrative costs 
We can estimate an optimal dimension for the pension fund, beyond which economies 
of scale achieved through an increase in the number of participants ends. We compute 
the point of maximum efficiency starting from the estimate model and calculating the 
elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to 𝑃௜௧, i.e. the dimension in terms of 
participants.  
Taking into consideration the quadratic model and deriving to 𝑃௜௧, cost elasticity can be 
obtained: 
Elasticity =
𝜕𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝑃 = 𝛼ଵ + 2𝛼ଶ𝑃 
We derive the optimal point setting elasticity equal to 1. When elasticity is 
inferior to 1, the fund may take advantage of economies of scale; on the other hand, 
when greater than 1, this is not possible. Therefore, by making elasticity correspond to a 
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value of 1 and keeping in mind that 𝑃 = ln(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠), we can determine the level 
of membership which implies the maximum use of economies of scale: 
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠∗ = 𝑒
ଵିఈభ
ଶఈమ  
The point 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠∗ represents the upper limit within which economies of 
scale can be found.  
Adopting the results presented in Table 2 in the fixed effect panel estimation as a 
reference, we obtain a threshold number of 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠∗ of 90,000. At the end of 
2013, only six closed funds had more than 90,000 participants. 
Figure 3. Trend for administrative costs per participant 
 
Figure 3 shows the values of administrative costs per participant in relation to 
number of participants in 2011, with the addition of a trend line based on coefficients 
derived from estimate 87 in Table 2. The graph shows that the economies of scale are 
very strong before the optimal point, while they become almost insignificant after that 
point. These results suggest that smaller funds have strong potential gain in reaching the 
optimal dimension, while bigger funds encounter no appreciable disincentives 
becoming larger.  
                                                 
7  Our choice for estimate 8 was guided by the greater joint significance of parameters 𝛼ଵ e 𝛼ଶ among the 
panel and fixed effect estimates. 
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6. Investment  costs,  type  of  fund  and  supply   
The investment costs include financial management commissions and possible 
guarantee commissions paid to managers, as well as payments made to the fiduciary 
bank. These costs are generally calculated as a percentage of the assets managed. The 
fund could acknowledge also an over performance commission to managers when they 
achieve a yield superior to certain limits which vary according to individual 
management agreements8. 
Investment costs are also accounted by open pension funds, and our analysis can 
therefore be extended to them. Moreover, we can consider the single investment lines 
rather than the fund as a whole9. 
We can presume that a larger amount of assets would allow a pension fund to take 
advantage of economies of scale and therefore achieve a reduction in investment costs 
over assets. 
However, from an initial descriptive analysis of the data, this hypothesis is not 
immediately confirmed. Table 3 reports average investment costs (arithmetical average) 
for closed and open pension funds in the 2007-2013 seven-year period compared to the 
total assets trend. The data shows how the investment costs over assets ratio do not 
display the expected pattern: although the assets of pension funds have increased over 
time, investment costs did not always decrease.  
Table 3. Investment costs over assets over time (2007-2013) 
  Closed funds  Open funds 
Year   
Average 
total assets 
(€m) 
Number of 
lines 
Investment 
costs over 
assets 
 
 
Average 
total assets 
(€m) 
Number of 
lines 
Investment 
costs over 
assets 
2007  121.36 94 0.153  12.34 329 0.894 2008  122.92 113 0.184  13.38 341 1.074 2009  157.42 119 0.202  18.21 310 1.004 2010  197.31 113 0.209  23.58 298 1.031 2011  223.65 113 0.183  30.15 271 1.052 2012  271.93 111 0.199  38.21 256 1.063 
2013  321.57 107 0.201  45.63 240 1.080 
Source: Mefop Data Processing using Previ|DATA data 
                                                 
8  With regard to closed pension funds, 37% of the lines offered foresee commissions for over-
performance. The lines which award a bonus to managers on achieving certain results are mainly mixed 
bonds (19%) and stocks (13%).  
9  In closed pension funds, the assets in an investment line are generally distributed over a number of 
agreements stipulated with several financial managers and with various cost conditions. Therefore, a 
more detailed evaluation at individual levels of management agreements should be carried out. 
However, at the moment, the data to perform this estimation are not available.  
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Table 4. Investment costs over assets by dimension (2013) 
 Closed funds Open funds 
Total assets Number of lines Investment costs over assets (%) Number of lines 
Investment costs 
over assets (%) 
0-5 mln 5 0.208 49 1.135 
5-20 mln 8 0.196 62 1.036 
20-50 mln 23 0.223 67 1.022 
oltre 50 mln 71 0.195 62 1.143 
Source: Mefop Previ|DATA  
 
Table 4 represents the 2013 trend in investment costs over assets of the lines 
classified by the amount of the total assets. While the ratio for open funds is higher in 
bigger lines, in closed funds the relation of investment cost and assets is not univocal.  
These dynamics could be explained considering that the financial manager might 
have greater, more effective but also more costly investment opportunities with the 
growth  of  the  fund’s  assets. Once beyond a certain threshold, economies of scale begin 
to reduce the impact of costs over assets. 
 
6.1. Definition of an econometric model for analyzing investment costs  
In order to assess which structural variables impact on investment costs, we can 
identify these main components:  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑀𝐹 +   𝑂𝑃𝐹 + 𝐺𝐹 + 𝐹𝐵 
where: 
x MF = management fees; 
x OPF = over-performance fee; 
x GF = guarantee fees; 
x FB = fiduciary bank fee. 
The management fee is paid to the managers who invest resources on behalf of 
the pension fund. This commission is generally expressed as a percentage of the assets 
managed. Closed funds (which select independent managers) with a large amount of 
resources could have a greater negotiating power. This impact might be less important 
for open funds, which generally choose managers within the same group of the sponsor 
company. Closed fund could add an element of competition allocating its assets to more 
than one manager. However, fragmentation of assets might reduce economies of scale. 
Furthermore, management costs could also be influenced by the type of management. A 
stock-based investment is generally more expensive. Managers can enabled by fund to 
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delegate their mandate to other managers. Delegation could increase costs of 
management. 
Over-performance fees are not present in all investment lines. Even when 
present, an incentive commission represents a cost for the fund only when the financial 
manager achieve a yield superior to an agreed limit. The impact of these commissions 
on the total cost is undoubtedly positive, but their inclusion might also carry to a 
reduction in management commissions requested by the managers themselves.  
The presence of a yield guarantee, particularly when investments are accounted 
with mark-to-market valorization, requires higher hedging costs for the pension fund.  
Lastly, fees for the fiduciary bank are expressed as a percentage of the assets 
held. This cost too could be influenced by the negotiating power of grater pension fund.  
The following relations can therefore be identified: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑓 ൭ 𝑃𝐹𝑇ถ
ା  ௜௙  ௢௣௘௡  ௙௨௡ௗ
, 𝐺⏟
ା
,%𝑆ด
ା
, #𝐴𝑀ถ
?
൱ 
where: 
x PFT = type of pension fund (closed or open fund); 
x G = presence of a guarantee; 
x %S = weight of stocks; 
x #AM = number of asset managers; 
In order to determine the marginal contribution of the variables in increasing or 
decreasing investment costs, we estimate of the following regression model:  
𝐼𝐶௜௧ = 𝜃 +   ෍ ൫  𝛼௝ + 𝛽௝𝑂𝐹௜൯ ∙ 𝑇𝐴௜௧
௝
௝ୀଵ,ଶ
+ 𝛾𝑂𝐹௜ + 𝛿𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀௜௧ 
Where: 
𝐼𝐶௜௧ = logarithm of investment costs of line i to time t; 
𝑇𝐴௜௧ = logarithm of total assets of line i to time t; 
𝑂𝐹௜ = dummy equivalent to 1 for open pension fund lines; 
𝑾𝒊𝒕 = matrix of the structural variables: 
a. dummy equivalent to 1 if line i offers a yield guarantee; 
b. maximum share of assets investible in stocks (based on line i’s  
classification); 
c. dummy equivalent to 1 if the line i has more than one manager; 
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𝜀௜௧= term of error , hypothesis i.i.d. 
As for administrative costs, a model with a squared dimensional variable is 
adopted to investigate the existence of economies of scale (or their absence) and how 
their intensity varies while the assets managed grow. Furthermore, the variables 
𝑂𝐹௜ ∙ 𝑇𝐴௜௧  and 𝑂𝐹௜ ∙ 𝑇𝐴௜௧ଶ , as well as the dummy 𝑂𝐹௜ have been added in order to 
capture the structural differences presented by open pension funds compared to closed 
ones. Open funds are product sold by financial institutions. In most cases, the resources 
are managed by the institute itself, and therefore the element of competition produced 
when closed funds select their managers is missing.  
The results shown in Table 4 suggest the presence of initial diseconomies of scale, 
therefore we can expect a value superior to 1 of 𝛼ଵ. At the same time, a negative value, 
𝛼ଶ, would indicate that such diseconomies tend to acquire minor importance as assets 
grow, even inverting the trend beyond certain levels of total assets10.  
We presume that the presence of a yield guarantee implies higher costs – linked to 
complexity of management and security margins – for the line. We also expect a 
positive coefficient for stock investment. In closed pension funds (almost all open 
pension funds have a single manager, without mandates) we investigate whether the 
distribution of the assets among various managers may allow greater efficiency: a 
bigger number of financial managers stimulates competition, but at the same time 
fragments the assets, reducing the negotiating power of the fund.  
6.2. The empirical results on financial costs 
Table 5 illustrates the main results of the panel estimates11. The presence of 
diseconomies of scale is confirmed in the linear estimates (estimates 1, 3 and 7). The 𝛼ଵ 
parameter is always greater than 1 and significant. For the open funds the 𝛽ଵ parameter 
is significant only in the OLS estimate. The hypothesis regarding the presence of 
constant economies of scale cannot be excluded.  
Moving on to the quadratic model, the coefficients relative to assets, if taken 
singularly, lose significance. Significance tests show the validity of the quadratic model, 
but the parameters 𝛼ଶ e 𝛽ଶ do not appear to be significant either singularly or jointly, 
                                                 
10 For open funds we expect a value greater than 1 of 𝛼ଵ + 𝛽ଵ and negative of 𝛼ଶ + 𝛽ଶ. 
11 See note 6. 
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thus rendering the estimate of the shape of the curve not robust. The hypothesis of the 
existence of constant economies of scale cannot be rejected – these results are 
particularly important for closed pension funds.  
Such outcomes could be explained by the particular nature of the supplementary 
pension funds industry in Italy. In fact, since their onset, the asset management of 
closed pension funds has been characterized by a relatively low level of management 
fees. This situation, driven by competition between financial managers, has gone on 
through time, thus reducing further opportunities of cost reduction.   
Our results may show that opportunities for taking advantage of economies of 
scale in terms of asset costs have already been taken up: greater efficiency might be 
found in improving the quality of service  rather than in reducing costs. 
Our estimate shows also that the presence of various asset managers in significant 
– this is true, however, only in the case of closed pension funds; the asset management 
in open funds is always runs by a single manager, who is generally a staff member of 
the  company  or  group  promoting  the  fund.  The  “greater  competition”  seems  to  produce  
a  greater  impact  than  that  of  “reduction  of  assets”,  given  its  negative  coefficient. 
More investment in stocks implies higher costs, and the parameter is very 
significant. The financial cost level of open pension funds is significantly higher then 
closed pension funds. 
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Table 5. Panel estimate of financial costs over assets (2007-2013)  
Dependent 
variable: 
Financial costs 
(logarithm) 
OLS Panel RE (Mundlak, 1979) Panel FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total assets (ln) 1.096*** 2.038*** 1.285*** 1.630** 1.588** 1.632** 1.591** 1.282*** 1.582** 
(0.012) (0.115) (0.069) (0.763) (0.694) (0.762) (0.695) (0.065) (0.694) 
Total assets (ln) 
squared 
  -0.028***   -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010   -0.010 
  (0.003)   (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)   (0.020) 
Total assets (ln) x 
OF dummy 
-0.071*** -0.646*** -0.109* -0.180 -0.292 -0.181 -0.292 -0.116** -0.292 
(0.013) (0.133) (0.057) (0.762) (0.702) (0.762) (0.702) (0.054) (0.701) 
Total assets (ln) 
squared x OF 
dummy 
  0.016***   0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005   0.005 
  (0.004)   (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)   (0.021) 
Guaranteed line 
(dummy) 
0.047** 0.046** 0.053 0.055     -0.081*     
(0.024) (0.023) (0.046) (0.046)     (0.042)     
Max investment in 
stocks 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***   0.003***       
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)       
Presence of 
various managers 
(dummy) 
-0.385*** -0.298*** -0.295*** -0.238***           
(0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.060)           
Open fund 
(dummy) 
2.862*** 8.092*** 2.234*** 7.297** 7.807** 8.187*** 7.747**     
(0.218) (1.109) (0.507) (3.073) (3.203) (3.002) (3.263)     
Constant -8.279*** -16.24*** -7.652*** -14.99*** -14.62*** -15.78*** -14.52*** -8.476*** -9.656*** 
(0.199) (0.986) (0.458) (2.700) (2.850) (2.613) (2.901) (0.608) (1.920) 
Observations 2712 2712 2712 2712 2810 2712 2810 2810 2810 
Number of 
idcomparto 
  471 471 487 471 487 487 487 
R-squared 0.944 0.946           0.880 0.880 
Test 𝛼ଵ = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.409 0.397 0.407 0.395 0.000 0.402 
Test 𝛼ଵ, 𝛽ଵ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test 𝛼ଵ, 𝛼ଶ = 0  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Test 𝛼ଶ, 𝛽ଶ = 0  0.000  0.193 0.644 0.189 0.636  0.671 
Test 𝛽ଵ, 𝛽ଶ = 0  0.000  0.010 0.015 0.010 0.015  0.016 
Hausman test     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficient associated with the presence of a guarantee is significant only in 
the estimates that do not foresee a percentage of investment in stocks and shows a 
negative value, contrary to our expectations. We should note, however, that the 
guaranteed lines of investment all show a very small stocks component. For this reason, 
when the variable relative to percentage of stocks is omitted, the coefficient associated 
with the presence of a guarantee becomes negative and increase its significance. On the 
other hand, being investments in stocks equal, the presence of a guarantee is associated 
to higher asset costs.  
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